March, 194o

THE SCOPE AND EFFECT OF TREASURY REGULATIONS
UNDER THE INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAXES*
STANLEY S. SuRREY I

In the recent decision of Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.' the Supreme Court sharply focused attention on an important problem of income tax administration which had been quietly
developing in recent years. This decision involved the question of the
relationship of Treasury Regulations to the interpretation and application of the revenue acts. While the circumstances of the case suggested
the dream-like details of a law school examination problem, the situation presented is nevertheless merely one of many possible intricate
patterns. The taxpayer corporation, Reynolds Tobacco Company, had
in 1929 sold at a profit some of its own stock which it had previously
purchased. The only statutory provision pertinent to the question of
whether such profit should be included in taxable income was the broad
definition of gross income in Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of
1928.2 Regulations 74, Article 66 under that Act contained the statement that "A corporation realizes no gain or loss from the purchase
or sale of its own stock," and this had been the uniform rule of the regulations since 192o. In May, 1934, partly as a result of a circuit court of

appeals decision 3 indicating that taxable income might arise where a.
corporation dealt in its own shares as if they were the stock of another
corporation, T. D. 4430 4 was issued by the Treasury Department providing that whether such transactions gave rise to taxable gain depended upon their real nature, and further that if a corporation did so
deal in its shares as if they were the shares of another corporation, gain
or loss should be computed as though the corporation were actually
dealing in such shares. This Treasury Decision retroactively amended
Regulations 74, Article 66. The Reynolds case was then pending in
the Board of Tax Appeals on other issues. Relying upon the Regulat B. S., i92, C. C. N. Y., LL. B., 1932, Columbia University; Research Assistant,
Columbia Law School; Assistant Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury Department; author of Assignments of Income (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 791; co-author with
John M. Maguire and Roger J. Traynor of Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938
(1939) 48 YALEz L. J. 5o9; contributor to various other legal periodicals.
Although the writer is employed by the United States Treasury Department, the
views set forth herein are entirely his own, and in no way indicate the views of the
Treasury Department.
I. 3o6 U. S. iO (1939), 39 COL. L. REV. 716. See Note (1939) 52 HAv. L. REV.

1163.

2. 45 STAT.797 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. §22 (1934).

3- Commissioner v. S. A. Woods Machine Co., 57 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. Ist, 1932),
cert. denied, 287 U. S. 613 (1932). The Court merely mentioned the regulation and
then proceeded to discuss the question as if the regulation did not exist.
4. XIII-i Cum. BULL. 36 (1934).
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tions as amended, the Commissioner in an amended answer claimed an
additional deficiency for 1929 on account of the profit from the sale
of the corporation's stock. Repeated reenactments of Section 22(a)
without change had occurred in the various Revenue Acts passed while
the original Regulation was in force and in the Revenue Acts of 1934,
1936, and 1938, while the amended Regulation was in effect. The Supreme Court held that Section 22(a) was "so general in its terms as
to render an interpretative regulation appropriate"; 5 that the successive Revenue Acts reenacting the definition of gross income without
change while the original Regulation was in force evidenced Congressional approval of the administrative construction embodied therein
and had thereby given such construction the force of law; and that
under these circumstances the amended Regulation could not operate
retroactively to upset the rule of law established by the Congressional
sanction of the original Regulation. The validity of the prospective
operation of the amended Regulation was expressly left undecided.
While a wide variety of combinations presented by the interaction of
Regulations and Revenue Acts and a host of consequent questions may
be immediately conjured up, we may postpone these questions until
after a short consideration of their background.
Although the voluminous Regulations 6 issued by the Treasury
Department under a revenue act are popularly thought of as alike in
legal force, a proper regard for the scheme of the Revenue Acts compels
distinctions. The preponderant majority of the Regulations are what
may be termed "interpretative regulations". Such Regulations constitute the Department's interpretations of the Revenue Act and serve to
guide the personnel of the Bureau and the taxpaying public in the application of the law. In view of the necessary brevity of the statutory
law and the manifold fact situations to which it applies, these guides
are of some assistance to taxpayers. But they still remain no more
than the Department's construction of the Revenue Act. Apart from
their binding effect upon the personnel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, they do not as Regulations possess any authority. While Section
62 of the Internal Revenue Code,7 like its counterpart in prior Revenue
Acts, provides that "The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe and publish all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of this chapter", this provision does not invest interpretative
regulations with the force of law. The standard of "needful... for
the enforcement" of a revenue act would hardly seem adequate in this
5. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 1o, 114 (x939).
6. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, Income Tax, under the Internal Revenue Code covers

69o pages plus an appendix.
7. 53 STAT. 32 (1939), 1 U. S. C. (Cur. Serv. 1939) 47.

Unless otherwise indi-

cated, the sections cited hereafter are those of the Internal Revenue Code.
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regard to support a delegation of legislative power. The issuance of
interpretative regulations would be equally valid without such a section
and they gain nothing by it. Their effect on the application of a Revenue Act lies rather in the weight accorded to them in the construction
of the act under the principles of statutory interpretation.
That the interpretative Regulations issued under Section 62 do not
possess the vital current of legislative power is evidenced by the fact that
in other selected sections of the various acts the Commissioner is given
specific authority to issue rules and regulations to round out the Congressional action. Thus, Section 44 provides for the return of income
on the installment basis "under regulations to be prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary"; Sections 17o and 189
allow the net operating loss deduction to estates, trusts, and members of
a partnership "under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with
the approval of the Secretary"; Section 113(a) (i9)

provides that the

allocation of the basis of old stock between such stock and dividend
stock shall be "made under regulations which shall be prescribed by
the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary". The Regulations thus specifically authorized must obviously be taken to possess
different attributes than those issued under Section 62, for otherwise
the careful particularization of Congress in these other sections would
be without meaning. The Regulations issued under these sections may
be termed "legislative regulations" for they are designed to implement
the purposely incomplete statutory provisions. While the structure
of the Revenue Acts thus would seem to force a differentiation between
interpretative and legislative Regulations, the question is pertinent
whether such differentiation has been observed in the determination
of the effect of Regulations upon the interpretation and application of
these Acts."
The interpretative regulations considered in their own right enjoy,
as respects taxpayers, no greater authority as to the meaning of the
statutory language interpreted than is possessed by the discussions in
the tax services or legal periodicals. But the recognized canons of
statutory interpretation invest such regulations with considerable importance. The use of contemporaneous administrative construction of a
statute as an aid to the ascertainment of its meaning is well established, 9
8. The third general class of regulations, that of procedural regulations, is not here
considered. Such regulations are quite generally regarded as of binding effect. Examples of this class of regulations are found in Sections 22 (b) (4), 51, 54, and 55.

In

addition, Section 62 may be considered as authorizing administrative or procedural
regulations of binding effect. In view of the variety of language in which the Congress
has clothed its delegations of power to the Commissioner, it is a difficult matter to ascertain the extent of the authority that has been granted in each situation. See infra
P. 577.
9. National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140 (1920) ; Brewster v. Gage,
280 U. S. 327 (i93o) ; Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375 (93)
;
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and where the Court has decided in favor of such construction, the
administrative construction is a convenient peg upon which to hang
the judicial preference. Another familiar canon of statutory interpretation which imparts significance to such Regulations is the principle
prescribing the effect of Congressional reenactment of statutory language which has received an administrative construction. This principle, as stated in the recent Reynolds decision, is that by virtue of such
reenactment, "under the established rule Congress must be taken to
have approved the administrative construction and thereby to have
given it the force of law." 10 The interpretative Regulation thus serves
to announce a rule which, through reenactment of the legislative language which it interprets, may be alchemized into a statutory command.
All of the successive acts are affected by this rule, for it has been applied to provide the interpretation of the first act in the series '- as well
as the last,12 and, therefore, will also fix the meaning of the intermediate acts. 13 The extensive scope of interpretative regulations and the
frequency of Revenue Acts thus combine to present a significant source
of statutory mandates which warrants further examination.
Like most canons of statutory interpretation or principles of constitutional law, the reenactment rule has qualifications which serve to
make its application impossible of prediction. The administrative construction, no matter how numerous may be the reenactments of statutory language, is of no moment where that language prescribes a contrary rule. "Where the law is plain the subsequent reenactment of a
statute does not constitute the adoption of its administrative construction." 14 Stated differently, the statutory language must be ambiguLouisville & Nashville R. R. v. United States, 282 U. S. 740 (1931) ; United States v.
Shreveport Grain &Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77 (1932).
Io. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. iO, 115 (939).
Other
cases applying this rule are: United States v. G. Falk & Brother, 204 U. S. 143 (1907) ;
United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compafiia, 209 U. S. 337 (19o8) ; National Lead

Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140 (1920) ; cases cited in notes II, 12 and 13 infra.
ix. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327 (1930); Burnet v. Thompson Oil and Gas
Co., 283 U. S. 301 (1931) ; McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 (1931) ;
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 269 (1933);
Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172 (1933); Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 216
(1935) ; Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938) ; Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 351
(1938) ; Walker v. United States, 83 F. (2d) 1O3 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
12. United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167 (1931) ; United States v. Dakota-Montana
Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459 (933) ; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79 (1938) ; First
Chrold Corporation v. Commissioner, 3o6 U. S. 117 (1939).
13. Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 172 (1934) ; Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 289 (1934); United States v. Safety Car
Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U. S. 88 (1936) ; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 306 U. S. Iio (i939).
14. Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 573, 582 (1938) ; Houghton v. Payne, 194
U. S. 88 (194o)
(rejecting the administrative construction despite evidence that it had
been repeatedly called to the attention of the Congress, which though urged to alter the
statute, had refused) ; Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245 (1926) ; cf. Rasquin v.
Humphreys, 3o8 U. S. 54 (1939).
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ous,15 general,1

silent,1 7 doubtful,1 8 susceptible of two construc-

19

tions.
With two lines of authority thus conveniently available, the
answer is necessarily uncertain until one or the other is chosen by the
Court. Thus in Koshland v. Helvering,20 the Court thought the
words of the statute so clear as to compel rejection of a long standing
Regulation unchanged during successive reenactments of the statutory
language, despite the fact that two dissenting Justices found statutory
warrant for the rule expressed in the Regulation, and the further fact
that rejection of such rule would produce untold confusion and manifold inequities. At the other extreme, the Court has indicated a preference for the administrative construction over contrary statements in
21
reports of Congressional committees respecting the statute construed.
In many cases the Court first itself construes the statutory language and
then throws in the administrative construction and Congressional reenactments to support the interpretation which it has reached.2 2 In a
recent case the Court, after interpreting the statute, proceeded to examine the administrative construction to see if it compelled a contrary
interpretation, but found that it did not.2 3 Judge Learned Hand has

said:
"The reasoning by which such rulings are deemed to be incorporated into the law upon its reenactment are familiar, and we
should have no right to disregard it, whether or not in a given
instance it represents a real assent by Congress. But not every
ruling is incorporated in the text because it is not repudiated; no
one has ever suggested anything of the sort. At most, administrative practice is a weight in the scale, to be considered but not to
be inevitably followed. . . . While we are of course bound to
15. National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140 (192o); Brewster v. Gage,
280 U. S. 327 (193o) ; Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., Inc., 308 U. S. 90 (1939).
16. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 3o6 U. S. iio (1939) ; Morrissey v.
Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344 (1935).
17. United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459 (1933).

18. McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 (193); United States v.
Shereveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77 (932).
1g. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 302 (C. C. A. 4th,
1938) ; cf. Securities Allied Corp. v. Commissioner, 95 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938),
where the administrative construction, if not the most reasonable interpretation, was
said to be at least a possible construction.
20. 298 U. S. 44i (1936).
21. McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 (931); United States v.
Shereveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77 (932).
22. Brewster v. Gage, 28o U. S. 327 (i93o) ; Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co.,

283 U. S. 301 (1931); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 (i93);
United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167 (93I) ; Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U. S. 341
(1932) ; Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172 (i933) ; Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U. S. i44

(934) ; Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 172 (1934) ; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 216 (I935); McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. io2 (1935);
Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 351 (1938).
23. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (i939), with which compare

Rasquin v. Humphreys, 3o8 U. S. 54 (ig39), in which the administrative construction
examined in the Sanford case was said to be plainly in conflict with the statute.
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weigh seriously such rulings, they are never conclusive; here, it
seems to us that they are not enough to turn the scale." 24
Of late, however, some of the lower courts, 2 5 and even the Supreme
Court at times, have applied the reenactment rule automatically without bothering to ascertain whether the statutory language was ambigu26
ous or clear.
Another qualification is that the administrative construction must
itself be clear, uniform, consistent-"ambiguous regulations are of
little value in resolving statutory ambiguities." 27 A recent decision,
Haggar Co. v. Helvering,28 implies that the construction must serve
a special administrative or governmental convenience or must embody
the results of specialized departmental knowledge or experience.
While the traditional statement of the rule permitting reliance upon an
administrative construction requires the construction to be long continued, 29 the reenactment rule apparently does not depend upon the
passage of time. Three 3 0 or two 31 reenactments over a short span of
years, or even one reenactment,8 2 have been regarded as sufficient to
24. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 973, 976 (C. C. A. 2d,
i937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 768 (1938).
25. E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; Commissioner v. Haines, 104 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; Helvering v. Cronin, io6
F. (2d) 907 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) ; Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 28 F. Supp. 322 (E. D. N.
Y. 1939). See Note (1939) 52 H~Av. L. REv. 1167.

26. Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 289 (1934); Lang
v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 264 (938) ; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79 (1938).
27. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. I, i6 (1932) ; Iselin v. United States,
270 U. S. 245 (1926) ; Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 3o8 U. S. 39 (939).
28. 6o Sup. Ct 337 (940).
The regulations in question interpreted the term
"first return", required under the statutory provisions in force prior to the Revenue
Act of i938 to contain the irrevocable statement of declared value for capital stock tax
purposes, to have a literal meaning and hence not to include a second return filed before the date prescribed for filing returns. The Court said that as this regulation was
adopted solely in compliance with what was thought to be the command of the statute;
it was not persuasive in its interpretation, and held the later return to be included
within the term "first return". Cf. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39

(1939).

29. United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compafiia, 209 U. S. 337 (19o8) ; National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. i4o (i92o) ; Iselin v. United States, 27o
U. S. 245 (1926). A decade is about the minimum time which has been permitted in
the tax cases.
30. Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172 (1933) (provision in 1924 Act, reenacted in
1926, 1928 and 1932 Acts); Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S.
289 (1934) (provision in 1921 Act reenacted in 1924, 1926 and 1928 Acts) ; Morrissey
v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344 (935)
(provision in 1924 Act reenacted in 1926, 1928

and

1932 Acts).
3. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327 (1930) (provision of 1921 Act reenacted in
19F4 and 1926 Acts); Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 299 (1932) (provision in
prior Acts reenacted in 1928 and 1932 Acts after change in 1926 in Regulations) ; F. H.
E. Oil Company v. Helvering, 308 U. S. 104 (939) (provision of 1926 Act reenacted
in 1928 and 1932 Acts).
32. McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 (93)
(provision of 1918
Act reenacted in 1921 Act) ; Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938) (Joint Resolution
of 1931 reenacted in 1932 Act) ; Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., Inc., 308 U. S. 90
(1939) (provision of 1926 Act reenacted in 1928 Act) ; cf. Taft v. Commissioner, 304

U. S. 351, 357 (1938). In these cases the regulations were in effect some time before
the reenactment. But cf. Janney v. Commissioner, 4o4 C. C. H. 1940 Fed. Tax Serv.
19138 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
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support the application of the rule. On the qualitative side, while the
cases generally involve reenactment in successive statutes of the original language, verbatim or substantially so, some decisions require only
that there be succeeding revenue acts, even though these later acts do
not repeat the original language and do not even concern themselves
with the subject matter to which it relates. 83 Generally, the administrative construction is to be found in the Treasury Regulations prescribed
by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary. Where a decision of the General Counsel for the Bureau (G. C. M.) or a ruling of
the Income Tax Unit of the Bureau (I. T.) embodies the construction,
the Supreme Court has in some cases relied upon such departmental
rulings, 34 and in others has said that they are of "little aid". 3 5 Decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals have been considered as evidencing the administrative construction of the statute,3 6 probably to the
chagrin of that body and the surprise of the Bureau, for a more realistic
view would consider them as evidence of judicial rather than administrative construction of the law.
With this brief summary as a background we may pause to consider whether these principles jibe with the realities of tax administration and legislation. Reliance upon administrative construction is reasonable enough if one understands that such construction is merely
one element in the case and that the citation of the standard cases
declaring the pertinent canon of statutory interpretation comes only
after the Court has decided in favor of the administrative construction.
But should reenactment of the statutory language add anything to the
weight to be given to the administrative construction? The Supreme
Court states that Congress must be taken to have been familiar with
the existing administrative interpretation, so that reenactment of the
statutory language indicates approval or ratification of that interpretation.3 7 Otherwise Congress, knowing the interpretation it had originally intended, would have corrected the administrative ruling if mis33- Commissioner v. Haines, 104 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 3d, i939); Helvering v.

Cronin, io6 F. (2d) 9o7 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) ; Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 28 F. Supp. 322
(E. D. N. Y. 1939).
34. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U. S. 144 (1934) ; McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U. S.
102 (1935) ; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 3o6 U. S. Iio (1939) ; Helvering

v. Wilshire Oil Company, Inc., 3o8 U. S.9o (1939); cf. Janney v. Commissioner, 404
C. C. H. 194o Fed. Tax Serv. 119138 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
35. Helvering v. N. Y. Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455 (1934) ; Biddle v. Commissioner,
302 U. S. 573, 582 (1938) ; cf. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 3o8 U. S. 39 (1939).
36. Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp., 288 U. S.4o6 (1933) ; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 3o6 U. S. IIo (1939).
37. National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140 (12o); Massachusetts
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 269 (1933) ; Zellerbach Paper Co. v.
Helvering, 293 U. S. 172 (1934); McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 102 (935);
United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U. S. 88 (1936); Taft v.
Commissioner, 304 U. S.351 (1938) ; Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 6o Sup. Ct. 337 (1940)
(aware "through its committees"). But cf. Helvering v. N. Y. Trust Co., 292 U. S.
455 (1934).
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taken. 88 As Congressional failure to alter the language interpreted is
said in some cases to indicate satisfaction with the construction even
where no reenactment has occurred,3 9 it is easy to see how the Court
would place reliance upon actual reenactment of that language. There
can be no quarrel with such reliance if it is shown that the administrative construction was actually called to the attention of Congress and
that nevertheless it did not alter its language. 40 But in the absence of
such evidence of actual ratification, is the presumption indulged in by
the Court based upon anything more than a polite gesture towards the
Congress?
The successive reenactment of the standard income tax sections of
the Revenue Acts is due simply to the advisability of having each successive revenue act contain all of the pertinent sections and to the fact
that a change in one section of the income tax generally requires tinkering with many other sections, so that the contrary system would produce
confusion in view of the many amendments and additions that would
result. 4 1 Such reenactment, therefore, may by no means be regarded
as evidencing actual Congressional consideration and approval of each
section so reenacted. There is some validity to the presumption if the
term "Congress" is expanded to incluae the group which may be considered as the Congressional tax advisors-the Staff of the Joint Committee, the House Legislative Counsel, the representatives of the Treasury Department, and those tax attorneys who appear to urge particular
legislation. But the limits of the knowledge of even this group and
the considerable time lag that often exists between awareness of an
existing defect and its correction by Congress serve to restrict the support for this presumption. Some Revenue Acts, such as those of 1937
and 1939, because of the need for speedy enactment and the pressure
of political considerations, are by Congressional agreement confined
to certain subjects, so that there is no disposition to correct defects
known to exist in fields not covered by the agreement. Even where a
Revenue Act is of wider scope, such as that of 1938, time limitations imposed by drafting difficulties and the claims made by other duties upon
the Congressmen concerned require observance of the principle of "first
things first", and both the Treasury and taxpayers push the matters
which they deem to be most important. Moreover, much worthwhile
38. Heiner v. Colonial Trust Co., 275 U. S. 232 (927)

; Biddle v. Commissioner,

302 U. S. 573 (1938).

39. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77 (932);
Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U. S. 341 (1932) ; cf. McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate
Co., 283 U. S. 488 (1931).
4o. But in Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S. 88 (1904), such express refusal was not
sufficient to prevent the Court's rejection of the administrative construction. And note
the cases in note 20 supra.

41. The relatively small number of amendments to the estate and gift taxes makes
unnecessary the reenactment of the entire tax in each revenue act.
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technical tax legislation must generally yield to the controversial tax
measures, such as rates of tax, treatment of capital gains and losses,
etc. In other instances, the very difficulty of finding a solution to a
recognized problem requires that its consideration be postponed even
when it is recognized that the existing situation is undesirable. In
addition, where some of the lower courts have taken a view contrary
to the administrative construction, is the Congressional silence to be
considered as an approval of that construction or merely as a willingness patiently to trust the courts to correct an erroneous interpretation ? 42 The Supreme Court has recently said that a taxpayer is not
entitled to place reliance upon the uniform decisions of four Circuit
Courts of Appeals and the Board of Tax Appeals interpreting a provision of the revenue laws where the Commissioner has not acquiesced
in such decisions and is still litigating the question. 43 Why, therefore,
should reenactment by Congress be considered as approval of an
administrative construction when the Congress knows that taxpayers
think the construction wrong and are contesting it in the courts? 44
Judge Learned Hand is more realistic when he states:
"To suppose that Congress must particularly correct each mistaken construction under penalty of incorporating it into the fabric
of the statute appears to us unwarranted; our fiscal legislation is
detailed and specific enough already." 45
All this points to the unreality of the presumption, an unreality which
the Reynolds case itself highlights, for there the Congress "approved"
contradictory interpretations.
42. In the Reynolds case situation, the lower courts had indicated that the wording
of the earlier regulations was too broad. (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 716, 718. Congressional ratification by silence or reenactment extends also to judicial construction as
well as administrative interpretation. McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S.
488 (I93I) ; United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167 (1931) ; Kales v. Commissioner, ioi
F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) ; Trumbull Steel Co. v. Routzahn, 292 Fed. ioo9 (N.
D. Ohio 1923) ; United States v. Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles, 3o F.
Supp. 113 (S. D. Cal. 1939). Where the judicial construction conflicts with the administrative, perhaps both should be disregarded. In Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner,
308 U. S. 39 (939), the Court said that administrative construction may be of persuasive weight in determining the meaning of a statute where the practice is not so
inconsistent with applicable decisions of the courts as to produce inconsistency and confusion, but if in conflict with such decisions the administrative construction should be
rejected.
43. Higgins v. Smith, 8 U. S. L. WEEK 92 (U. S. 1940).
44. In Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 6o Sup. Ct. 337 (1940), the Commissioner
was contending that in changing certain statutory provisions for the future, Congress
must be considered as thereby approving the administrative construction given to the
earlier statutes. The Court stated that it must be assumed that Congress was aware
of both the administrative construction and the litigation then pending in the instant
case and in another in which that construction had been challenged. It then said, "If
we are to draw inferences it would seem as probable that Congress was content to
leave the problems of the past to be solved by the courts where they were then pending,
rather than to preclude their solution there." Id. at 342.
45. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 973, 976 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 768 (1938). Janney v. Commissioner, 404 C. C. H. 194o
Fed. Tax Serv. I 9138 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), quotes this language with approval.
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Despite the lack of factual support for the presumption of Congressional knowledge, we find the courts leaning toward an automatic
application of the reenactment rule to give interpretative regulations
the force of law. The acceptance of the rule is such, moreover, that
the Supreme Court has applied it to legislative regulations without
attempting to distinguish its bearing upon regulations of this character
as compared to those of an interpretative nature. 46 While legislative
regulations may be tested in the courts, 47 their validity turns on the
sufficiency of the standard accompanying the delegation of power and
the compliance of the regulation with such standard and with the criterion of "reasonableness". 48 Successive reenactments of the statutory
language authorizing a legislative regulation are relevant only to the
question of the conformity of the regulation with the standard prescribed. The issue is not the meaning of ambiguous statutory language as in the case of an interpretative regulation, but whether the
rule prescribed by the administrative branch lies outside of the boundaries marking the limits of the choice permitted by the Congress. To
this extent the reenactment rule is applicable to legislative regulations. 49
The Reynolds case drew attention to the problems arising from the
impact of the reenactment rule upon a change in the administrative
construction. The Court held, as stated above, that as the original
Regulation had obtained the force of law by reason of successive reenactments of the pertinent statutory section, the new Regulation could
not operate retroactively.5 0 If the premise regarding the metamorphosis
of the original Regulation be conceded, no quarrel can be had with the
conclusion of the Court. The statement that the original Regulation
had been given the force of law can mean only that statutory words
ambiguous on their face must be construed as meaning what the original Regulation said they meant. As an interpretative regulation con46. Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co., 283 U. S. 301 (931) ; Burnet v. S. & L.
Bldg. Corp., 288 U. S. 406 (1933) ; United States v. Dakota-Montano Oil Co., 288
U. S. 459 (1933) ; cf. Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375 (1931).
47. Where the Congress requires that the taxpayer must consent to the regulation
if he desires to obtain a privilege so conditioned, it may not be possible to test the
regulation.
48. E. g., Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U. S. 129
(936) and Titsworth v. Commissioner, 73 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934), rejecting
a legislative regulation on the ground of non-conformity with the standard prescribed.
49. Successive reenactments after an administrative construction interpreting the
statute to confer the power to make legislative regulations may serve to solidify such
interpretation. Securities Allied Corp. v. Commissioner, 95 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 2d,
1938).
5o. Lower courts had previously taken this position. See Walker v. United
States, 83 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) stating that if the courts are bound by the
executive construction plus statutory reenactments, the executive department should
likewise be bound; Mayes v. Paul Jones & Co., 27o Fed. 121 (C. C. A. 6th, ig2i).
Accord with the Reynolds- decision: Commissioner v. Haines, 104 F. (2d) 854 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1939) ; Helvering v. Cronin, io6 F. (2d) 907 (C. C. A. 8th, i939) ; Guggenheim
v. Rasquin, 28 F. Supp. 322 (E. D. N. Y. 1939); cf. Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U. S.
264 (1938).
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trary to the statute is of no force, the new regulation thus falls. Hence,
if the applicable language in the Revenue Act of 1928 meant that a
corporation did not realize income from the sale of its own stock at a
profit, a regulation stating that it did would be a nullity, whether that
regulation was issued as a current interpretation of the Revenue Act
of 1928 or years later as an amendment of an earlier regulation. 51 But
if the statutory language were said to reach the profit so realized, so
that any contrary regulation would be void, a regulation requiring that
the profit be included in gross income is valid, whether that regulation
was promulgated currently with the statute construed or some time
thereafter. 2 The choice which Justice Cardozo has said is possessed
by a state as respects the effect of a decision of its highest court overruling a prior precedent:
"It (a state) may say that decisions of its highest court, though
later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions. .

.

On the other hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma

that the law declared by its courts had a Platonic or ideal existence
before the act of declaration, in which event the discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never been, and the reconsidered
declaration as law from the beginning." 5 3
cannot in this regard exist for the Commissioner. He must hold to the
ancient dogma.
The crux of the problem is the interpretation to be given to the
Revenue Act of 1928 and only on this point can the actual decision be
considered vulnerable. It may be true that a court interpreting in
1928 the provisions of that Act would be forced under the applicable
principles of statutory construction to reach the conclusion that it did
not tax the profit in question. But a court interpreting those provisions
in 1939, whether in respect of the Revenue Act of 1928 or of 1938,
would not seem so bound, for unlike the former Court, it would have
before it conflicting administrative interpretations, each of which had
the support of successive Congressional reenactments. There would
thus be no consistent administrative construction, for the uniformity of
the construction before 1934 was destroyed by the change in that year,
51. Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co., 281 U. S. 599 (93o); Miller v. United
States, 294 U. S. 435 (1935) ; Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U. S. 54 (1939) ; cases cited
in note 14 supra.

52. Thus, in Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (1939), the Court
said that a change in administrative practice to conform to judicial decision, here a
circuit court of appeals decision, and which was consistent with decisions of the Court,
would be accepted as controlling in preference to the earlier practice. That the Court
was merely rejecting an incorrect interpretation and giving retroactive effect to a later,
but correct, interpretation is emphasized by the companion ruling in Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U. S. 54 (1939), in which the earlier practice was said to be plainly in conflict with the statute.
53. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 364-365
(1932).
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just prior to the passage of the Revenue Act of I934."4 A contention
that the Congress must be presumed to have approved of the application of the former construction as respects the Revenue Acts up to 1934
and of the later construction as respects the Revenue Acts after that
year (leaving to a toss of a coin the status of the Revenue Act of 1934,
in view of the short time interval between the change in the regulations
and that Act) is as artificial as an assertion that by its later reenactment the Congress must be taken as approving of the retroactive
application expressed in the new Regulation. The Court therefore would
seem compelled to disregard the administrative construction as an aid
in ascertaining the meaning of the Revenue Act of 1928 and, consequently, to interpret those provisions for itself. The difficulty of such
a task should not have led to its avoidance through the creation of
seemingly automatic rules of statutory construction which themselves
may well give rise to even greater difficulties.
The Internal Revenue Code contains a provision, Section 3791 (b),
taken from the Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1928, which reads as follows:
"The Secretary, or the Commissioner with the approval of
the Secretary, may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling,
regulation, or Treasury Decision, relating to the internal revenue
laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect." 55
While the Commissioner pointed to this Section in the Reynolds case
as authority for the issuance of retroactive regulations it hardly supports his contention. Although the Section clearly recognizes the
existence of retroactive regulations, it does not authorize their issuance. 5 6 Rather, it permits the Treasury to limit the retroactivity of
a regulation which would perforce have to be applied with unlimited
retroactivity in the absence of this Section. So construed, the Section
still has a wide scope. If the Commissioner, revising his interpretation
of the law, issues an interpretative regulation altering a previous rule,
the new regulation being no more than an interpretation of the statute
would obviously have to operate retroactively were it not for the permission given to the Commissioner to avoid the hardship to taxpayers
that would result from a retroactive application. Or if the Supreme
Court interprets the statute contrary to an existing regulation, thus
54. See, for example, Walker v. United States, 83 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 8th,
1936), where it was stated that the later regulation is pertinent to the question of
whether the earlier regulation is so plainly erroneous as to compel its rejection.
55. For the legislative history of this Section and a discussion of its constitutionality, see PAUL, SELECTD STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (2d Ser. 1938) 72 et seq.
56. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935) holds to the contrary, stating that regulations must be regarded as tentative,
for by reason of this Section, amendments thereto are retroactive unless otherwise
stated. See also (ig3g) 39 COL. L. REV. 716, 719.
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compelling the issuance of a new regulation in conformity with the
decision, the Commissioner may likewise protect those taxpayers who
relied on the former ruling. 57 The Section thus authorizes the Commissioner as an administrative matter to make his change in interpretation, or one forced upon him, prospective only in much the same fashion
as a court may limit the effect of a reversal of a precedent to future
situations.58 But it can hardly be contended that, under a statute
which does not give authority to the Commissioner to make binding
interpretative regulations as respects the future, this Section gives him
a general power to make such regulations for the past. The Court
did state in the Reynolds case that this Section authorized the Treasury
to correct misinterpretations, inaccuracies, or omissions in the regulations and affect pending cases unless in its judgment there was some
good reason to make the change operate only prospectively, but that
it did not permit the Treasury to repeal the rule of law for the past
achieved by giving the former regulation the force of law. 59 As indicated above, this interpretation of the Section seems to proceed from
a false perspective.
An analogous problem is presented where the original interpretation is by way of a Supreme Court decision. Since the reenactment
rule extends to judicial as well as administrative construction, can the
Supreme Court reverse itself retroactively if Congressional reenactments have intervened? The Reynolds case suggests a negative answer, so that on principle the Court would therefore seem limited to
announcing a rule for the future. Whether it can even do that in turn
would appear to depend upon whether the Treasury will be permitted
to change its regulations prospectively.
Turning therefore from the retroactive effect of a change in a
Regulation, we may examine the prospective application of the new Regulation. If the Revenue Act of 1928 had plainly said that the profit
on the sale by a corporation of its own stock was not to be taxed, a
Regulation no matter when issued attempting to tax such a profit would
be invalid. As the Court in the Reynolds case construed the statute
so to provide, albeit the construction came about through the former
Regulation being exalted to the status of a rule of law, the new regulation would seem to be invalid, whether taken as a construction of the
Revenue Act of 1928 or of any of the later Revenue Acts. The words
of Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1928 were construed to mean
57. See report of Senate Finance Committee, SEN. REP. No. 960, 7oth Cong., ist
Sess. (1927) 40. The Commissioner, however, in a situation in which the old but
invalid regulation adversely affected the taxpayer, could not say that the new regulation operated only prospectively. See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 55, at 95, n. 95.

58. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932).

59. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. IIO, i6 (1939).
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no tax; the same words in the later acts can scarcely be given a different meaning. Yet the Court in the Reynolds case specifically reserved
judgment on this question, stating that it was not necessary then to
determine whether "the alteration of the existing rule, even for the
future, requires a legislative declaration or may be shown by reenactment of the statutory provision unaltered after a change in the applicable regulation". 60 The Court added that "It may be that by the
passage of the Revenue Act of 1936 the Treasury was authorized thereafter to apply the Regulation in its amended form." 61 And in the later
case of Rasquin v. Humphreys,6" the Court, with respect to an amendment to the estate tax Regulations, held that whatever validity the
amendment may have prospectively, it was so plainly in conflict with the
statute as to preclude retroactive application. The lower courts have
generally taken the position that once the Regulation is embedded in the
statute only an express legislative declaration may dislodge it.63 But in
view of the explicit reservation of the point by the Supreme Court in
the above two cases, it is necessary, to question the analysis first made
and to consider whether a different result is obtained where the interpretation previously given to the statutory language was one arrived
at through reliance upon administrative construction plus statutory
reenactment rather than one clearly expressed in the statutory words
themselves.
The discussion on this point has so far concerned an interpretative
regulation. Where a legislative regulation is involved, the questions are
not so difficult. As the regulation, by virtue of the grant of legislative
power, is here part of the legislative scheme, it would seem that the
authority of the Treasury to prescribe a retroactive rule is measured
by the ability of the Congress itself to make the retroactive command. 6 4
If the old regulation is invalid, however, the new regulation should be
given full retroactive effect, as otherwise the statute would be incomplete and unworkable. 65 As to the future, there should be no reason
why the delegation of legislative power may not be regarded as a con6o. Ibid.
6r. Id. at 117.
62. 308 U. S. 54 (1939).
63. E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Helvering, 98 F.

(2d) 69 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); cf.
Walker v. United States, 83 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); Helvering v. Wilshire

Oil Co., Inc., 95 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).

64. The extent of Congressional power with respect to retroactive tax legislation
is far from clear. The latest decision bearing on this matter is Welch v. Henry, 305
U. S.134 (1938). A dissent in Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner,
76 F. (2d) 892, 897 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), aff'd, 297 U. S. 129 (1936), states that legislative regulations should not be applied retroactively.
65. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U. S. 129 (1936).
The Court said that the application thus given to the new regulation was no more retroactive than was that of a judicial decision construing a statute. Accord: Titsworth v.
Commissioner, 73 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
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tinuing one permitting prospective changes. At the very least, as each
reenactment is a new grant of power, the area of possible doubt is
narrow. The Court, however, has not approached the question in this
manner. In Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet,66 a case arising under the Revenue Act of 1918, the Court applied a legislative regulation under that
Act, but as amended retroactively in 1926, without any consideration
of the retroactive question. The Court pointed out that the revised
Regulation had Congressional approval through later reenactment of the
statutory language.
The decision rendered in the current term of the Supreme Court
in Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., Inc., 7 a case which had been regarded
as offering the Court an opportunity to clarify these questions, serves
only to increase the confusion. The issue in the case was whether
intangible development costs which had been treated by the taxpayer
as deductible expense in computing its taxable net income should also
be deducted in applying the limitation of Section 114(b) (3) of the
Revenue Act of 1928, providing that the allowance for percentage
depletion shall not exceed 50 percent of the net income of the taxpayer
(computed without allowance for depletion) from the property. That
Act in Section 23 (1) allowed as a deduction a reasonable allowance for
depletion, "such reasonable allowance in all cases to be made under
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Commissioner, with the
approval of the Secretary". The Regulations under the Revenue Acts
of 1921 and 1924, in construing a limitation similar to that contained
in Section I14(b) (3) but with respect to a deduction for discovery
depletion, had presumably not required the deduction of intangible
development costs. 68 The Revenue Act of 1926 substituted percentage
depletion for discovery depletion in the case of oil and gas wells, but
no regulations were issued under that Act with respect to the 50 percent limitation as it applied under percentage depletion, although the
rule with respect to discovery depletion, retained in the Act for mines,
was continued. 69 But late in 1927 a G. C. M.7 0 stated that such development costs should be deducted in applying the limitation respecting
percentage depletion. The Regulations under the Revenue Act of 1928
formally took this view, 71 and like provisions appeared in the Regulations under the Revenue Acts of 1932, 1934, 1936 and 1938. These
later acts had reenacted the pertinent statutory provisions without
66. 287 U. S.

299 (1932).

67. 308 U. S. 90 (939).

68. U. S. Treas. Reg. 62 and 65, Art. 2oi (h). The regulations required that
"operating expenses" be deducted, and the Treasury practice did not consider development costs as such expenses.
69. U. S. Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 201 (h).
70. G. C. M. 2315, VI-2 CuM. BULL 21 (1927).
71. U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art

221 (i).
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change. The taxpayer contended that the rule of the Regulations under
the Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924 and 1926 was embedded in the law
and therefore the Regulations under the Revenue Act of 1928 were
invalid.
In answer to this contention the Court first stated that the regulation in question, pertaining to Section 114(b) (3), was issued under
the "rule-making power" of Section 23(1). 7 2 It then said that while
it may be assumed that the administrative construction of the earlier
acts had received legislative approval by reenactment in 1924, this did
not mean that the construction survived the Revenue Acts of i926 and
1928. There was no comparable regulation under the Revenue Act
of 1926, and under that Act the Commissioner had adopted a contrary practice, viz., that stated in the G. C. M. The reenactment in
1928 at a time when the Treasury practice had changed therefore restored the phrase "net income . . . from the property" to its "original

ambiguity" and it "became peculiarly susceptible to new administrative interpretation". 73 This may be taken as argument one. The Court
then stated that in any event the validity of the regulation seems clear.
The rule that administrative construction receives legislative approval
by reenactment of the statutory provision does not mean that a regulation interpreting one act becomes frozen into another merely by reenactment and cannot be changed prospectively through the exercise of
appropriate rule-making powers. The contrary conclusion would drastically curtail the scope and materially impair the flexibility of administrative action; it would deprive the administrative process of its valuable qualities of ease of adjustment to change, flexibility in the light of
experience, swiftness in meeting new or emergency situations. This
apparently constituted argument two. The Court then stated that the
only remaining question is whether the regulation in question was
within the power of the Commissioner to promulgate. It pointed out
that this regulation operated only prospectively, and not retroactively
as did the regulation in the Reynolds case. The rule-making power, it
said, may here be found in Section 23 (1). While the taxpayer contends
that the Commissioner should not be considered as having the power to
change from time to time, through altered regulations, the measure
of "net income

.

.

.

from the property", this result of a change in the

regulation is immaterial if the power to promulgate the new regulation
exists. It then asserted that Section 1i4 (b) (3) was ambiguous so
that administrative interpretation of its language was peculiarly appro72. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90, 94 (939).
We are not here concerned with the merits of the conclusion on this and other points not pertinent to the
discussion in the text.
73. Id. at ioo.
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priate. The complexities of the depletion allowance also warranted such
administrative action and likewise an interpretation of Section 23(1)
that would strengthen the administrative power to deal with depletion
problems. These considerations were said to reaffirm the conclusion
that the rule-making power existed and that restrictions on that power
should not be lightly imposed where the regulation is only prospective.
This may be considered as argument three.
If Section 23 (1) did extend to Section 114(b) (3), as the Court
apparently decided, so that it had before it a legislative regulation, the
decision should have been simple: The regulation was prescribed under
an express grant of power and as it was within the standard of a "reasonable allowance", it was valid. 74 But argument one is almost nonsensical in this light, for it strives hard to create a source of power for
the regulation through a restoration of the statutory language to an
ambiguous condition, although the Revenue Act of 1928 itself provided
the necessary authorization. Argument two has meaning only if it is
regarded as a caution not to apply the reenactment rule to legislative
regulations. Argument three is either an assertion that a legislative
regulation is involved or else an unnecessarily long and complicated
statement that the power to make legislative regulations should not be
circumscribed. But if Section 23(1) did not extend to Section 114(b)
(3)-and the Court seems not too sure of their relationship, for it
twice refers to the ambiguity of the statutory language in Section
I14(b) (3) as making it peculiarly susceptible to administrative interpretation-so that only an interpretative regulation is involved, much
of the decision is difficult to comprehend. Argument one would seem
valid only if it were based on the ground that the statutory change in
the Revenue Act of 1926 broke the chain, so that the prior administrative construction embedded in the law with respect to discovery depletion was not binding as respects percentage depletion. As the language
pertaining to the latter deduction was ambiguous the Court could properly refer to the administrative construction in the regulations under
the Revenue Act of 1928 as an aid in the interpretation of the statutory language. But if the argument made by the Court is accepted
at its face value, it implies that a change (here made in a G. C. M.)
in a regulation, plus one reenactment, likewise breaks the chain, so
that identical statutory language may then receive a contrary construction. Presumably, if the new regulation survived another act it would
then possess the force of law. 75 The new Regulation could not apply
74. See the dissent below, 95 F. (2d) 971, 975 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) supporting the
regulation on this ground.
75. F. H. E. Oil Co. v. Helvering, 6o Sup. Ct 26 (I939), involving the same
situation as the Wilshire case, but with respect to the Revenue Act of 1932, was said
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to the current act but would serve as an aid in the construction of the
succeeding act. Under this approach, in the Reynolds case the new
regulation announced in 1934 plus the enactment of the Revenue Act
of 1936 (rather than the Act of 1934 in view of the short period of
time intervening between that Act and the change) rendered Section
22(a) of that Act ambiguous and susceptible of either construction.
The later reenactment in the Revenue Act of 1938 could then be considered under the established rule as ratifying the new Regulation and
thus fixing the interpretation of the Revenue Act of 1936 as well as the
later acts. It will be remembered that the Court in that case did state
that it may be that by the passage of the Revenue Act of 1936 the Treasury was authorized thereafter to apply the new Regulation. Argument
two may be considered as advancing the practical reasons supporting
argument one. Argument three would not seem to be particularly
relevant, except as emphasizing the particular character of the ambiguity as supporting the reliance upon administrative construction.
One difficulty with this view is that apparently the Court denied
it, for in stating that the reenactment rule could not be construed as
forbidding a change in the regulations, it said that the contrary conclusion would mean that before the new Regulation could go into effect
a succeeding revenue act would be required, so that the new Regulation would be merely tentative and in effect submitted to the Congress
for its approval.
"Outstanding regulations which had survived one Act could be
changed only after a preview by the Congress. In preparation for
a new revenue Act the Commissioner would have to prepare in
advance new regulations covering old provisions. Their effectiveness would have to await congressional approval of the new Act.
The effect of such procedure, so far as time is concerned, would be
precisely the same as if these new regulations were submitted to
the Congress for approval. .

.

. the result would be to read into

the grant of express administrative powers an implied condition
that they were not to be exercised unless, in effect, the Congress
had consented. We do not believe that such impairment of the
administrative process is consistent with the statutory scheme
which the Congress has designed." 76
The Court may thus be stating that the new Regulation may operate
prospectively from the date of its inception and, if a valid construction,
by the Court to be an a fortiori case. The lower court in the Wilshire case, 95 F. (2d)

971 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), rejected the argument that reenactment in i932 ratified the
new regulation, on the ground that taxpayers "are not required to have the prescience
to discern a difference in Congressional viewpoint two years in the future". Id. at ,73.

But this view completely overlooks the fact that the reenactment rule is founded upon
the mystic ability of taxpayers to divine whether a future Congress will or will not
reenact the statutory provision interpreted by the administrative construction.
76. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 3o8 U. S. go, 1oi (1939).
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will have legal force from that time on.7 7 But whichever of these
two approaches regarding the prospective operation of the new interpretive Regulation is taken, there seems to be no statutory warrant for
the result achieved. Certainly it casts doubt upon those cases rejecting
a regulation as contrary to the statute despite repeated reenactments, 7 1
for by hypothesis the new Regulation given prospective effect under this
doctrine is equally contrary to the statute at its inception but becomes
possible of acceptance after reenactment by Congress. Yet the rejected
Regulations in the above cases had likewise received the tacit approval
of Congress. To reply that the distinction lies in the manner in which
the earlier statutes received their construction is either to reject the
rationale of the canon of statutory interpretation permitting reliance
upon administrative construction, or to alter the traditional view of the
powers of the Commissioner.
The Court may be stumbling toward an objective which as
yet is not clearly disclosed. Perhaps it is motivated by the belief that
the taxpayer is entitled to rely on administrative regulations, so that
their retroactive alteration is unsound tax administration. 79 The facts
of the Reynolds case were compelling in this regard, for the Commissioner changed his regulation while the case was in the Board of Tax
Appeals. It has been contended that it is somewhat ironical to hold that,
although the Treasury was not compelled to interpret Section 22(a),
nevertheless since it chose to do so in one year it thereby restricted
its freedom of interpretation in a later year. But this argument disre77. The Court referred to the decision in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344
In that case a regulation under the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 stated that
a Massachusetts trust came within the term "association" if the beneficiaries possessed
a certain degree of control, the regulations being based upon the construction of a
(1935).

previous decision of the Court. As a result of a Supreme Court decision in z924 stating that control was not the only criterion, the regulation was in that year changed accordingly. The instant case concerned the Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1926. The Court
said:
"As the statute merely provided that the term 'corporation' should include
'associations', without further definition, the Treasury Department was authorized
to supply rules for the enforcement of the Act within the permissible bounds of
administrative construction. Nor can this authority be deemed to be so restricted
that the regulations once issued, could not later be clarified or enlarged so as to
meet administrative exigencies or conform to judicial decision. . . . We find no

ground for the contention that by the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1924 the
Department was limited to its previous regulations as to associations." Id. at 354.
The Court then pointed out that the revised regulation had Congressional approval by
reason of later reenactments.
78. E. g., Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245 (1926), and cases cited note 14
.supra.
79. Compare the concurrence of Justices Stone and Cardozo in Brush v. Commissioner, 3oo U. S. 352, 374 (937)

on the ground that the taxpayer had brought himself

within the terms of the exemption in the regulations, and the explanation of that case
in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938).

The Court in adopting an adminis-

trative construction has stated that rejection would produce inconvenience and inequity.
Brewster v. Gage, 28o U. S. 327 (930) ; cf. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308
U. S. 39 (1939) ; Pictorial Review Co. v. Helvering, 68 F. (2d) 766 (App. D. C. 1934).
The vigorous dissent of Justice Roberts in Higgins v. Smith, 8 U. S. L. WEE= 92, 94
(U. S. 1940), is interesting in this connection.
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gards the existence of the first construction and the reliance that it may
have occasioned. Something is wrong with a system which permits
the Commissioner in the courts to controvert the validity of regulations issued by the Treasury.80 The Court may be applying a judicial
check on retroactivity where it feels that the Commissioner has unjustifiably failed to exercise the power granted him in Section 3791 (b)
to prescribe an administrative check. But it is evident, as the Court
itself seems to realize, that the device utilized in the Reynzolds case to
attain this end, because of its automatic character and the difficulties
of securing legislation on a variety of technical points, comes dangerously close to preventing the Commissioner from meeting new problems and conditions. Furthermore, that device has an undesirable
restrictive effect upon the Commissioner when he first formulates the
regulations under a new statutory provision. If a doubtful point arises,
he may by playing safe and saying nothing thereby avoid the dangers
lurking in the reenactment rule. The regulations will in this event
merely repeat almost verbatim the statutory language, for even a paraphrase may be dangerous. Such regulations are obviously of no aid
to the taxpayers or the Bureau personnel. Or the Commissioner may
choose the other alternative of always taking the benefit of the doubt
so as to protect the revenues. Taxpayers will likewise not welcome the
adoption of such a rule of thumb to settle all doubtful issues. The
mechanical reliance upon reenactment after the change in regulations
may in addition make the interpretation of the revenue acts vary depending upon whether the Congress sticks closely to the system of legislation amendatory of a code or continues because of the dictates of convenience completely to reenact the income tax title.,' It likewise might
restrict the Supreme Court from reversing an erroneous precedent.8 2
8o. E. g., in Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 264 (938), the Commissioner contended in the Supreme Court that a regulation, later changed, was at variance with the
statute, unreasonable, and without effect. In Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers,
299 U. S. 582 (938), the Government in successfully resisting a petition for certiorari
advanced an argument which it conceded was contrary to the position taken in an existing regulation. In Helvering v. Hallock, 8 U. S. L. WEEK 192 (U. S. 194o) and companion cases, the Government likewise asserted a position in conflict with an existing
regulation. See infra p. 579.
81. In view of the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code, it remains to be seen
whether the Congress will retain the prior practice of having each major revenue act
contain the entire income tax, or will merely make amendments to the Code. The answer probably depends on the number of amendments and the extent of the mechanical
difficulties that would exist under the latter method.
82. If an interpretative regulation is adopted because of a Supreme Court decision
construing the statute, how can either the Commissioner or the Supreme Court alter
that construction, even for the future, where the decision and regulation have been followed by Congressional reenactments? This is the problem presented in Helvering v.
Halock, 8 U. S. L. WEEK 192 (U. S. 194o) and companion cases discussed infra p. 579.
It may perhaps be contended that in some instances the Congress has because of the
subject matter left the meaning of the statutory language to Court decision and is willing to abide by the shifting interpretations of the Court. Thus, in the situation presented in the above cases it would be difficult to write a satisfactory statutory provision
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While the reenactment rule may at one time have been regarded by the
Court as offering an easy way to avoid admittedly difficult problems of
statutory construction, the Court now realizes that its apparent simplicity
was deceptive. The Court, and the lower tribunals as well, now find
that in almost every case the parties are assiduously combing the regulations and rulings to see what has been the administrative practice and
how such practice can be used to advantage. But for the Court to
extricate itself from the position in which it has been placed by its
own decisions is by no means an easy task.
It is evident that this portion of the tax field is in pressing need
of clarification. The scope of the rule-making power now possessed
by the Commissioner is becoming increasingly more uncertain. If one
were to suggest that the Commissioner be authorized to prescribe rules
and regulations interpreting the Revenue Acts which if reasonable shall
be binding upon the taxpayer, he would in no time be attacked by angry
taxpayers uttering cries of bureaucracy and administrative supremacy.
Yet is not that almost the result that obtains under the Court's decisions? There is the declaration in the Reynolds case, and in other
decisions, 83 that where the statute uses ambiguous terms, or is general in
its language, an interpretative regulation is appropriate. Certainly, if
the statute were unambiguous, any regulation other than one in accord
with the statutory language would be unreasonable, so that the suggested rule is not at variance with the Court's position. The statement
that ambiguous or general language makes an interpretative regulation
peculiarly appropriate has a strange sound to the traditionalist who
remembers that the Court has invalidated statutes on the ground of
improper delegation of power where it found the standard set forth
in the statute to be too indefinite.84 The traditionalists may be right,
which could deal equitably with the multitude of fact variations that existed and conse-

quently it may be said that Congress left the interpretation of the general provisions
stated in the acts to the Court, with the recognition that judicial shifts in interpretation
were bound to occur. Similarly, matters that are dependent upon a construction of the
Constitution may be said to have been left subject to the changing temper of the Court.
E. g., taxation of the compensation of public officials (prior to the Public Salary Tax
Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 32, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., 1939) and of income linked with the
States, a field in which drastic retroactive changes in interpretation have occurred. By
a parity of reasoning, regulations in these situations could likewise be changed, at least
for the future, for otherwise the Commissioner, unless he chose to argue contrary to
existing regulations, would be prevented from urging that the Court should shift its

viewpoint.
83. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344 (i935) ; Helvering v. Wilshire Oil
Co., Inc., 308 U. S. go (1939). In Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 44i, 446 (1936),
the Court said:
"Where the Act uses ambiguous terms, or is of doubtful construction, a clarifying
regulation or one indicating the method of its application to specific cases not only
is permissible but is to be given great weight by the courts.

And the same prin-

ciple governs where the statute merely expresses a general rule and invests the
Secretary of the Treasury with authority to promulgate regulations appropriate to
its enforcement."

84. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (935).
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but they are talking of another world; as respects Federal taxation
they have all the law books on their side except the United States Reports. But to push the argument further, can it be contended that, while
the power to issue interpretative regulations may be conceded, under
the suggested system a taxpayer would be bound by the Regulation if
reasonable, whereas today he may attack any interpretative regulation,
even one appropriate because of ambiguous language, and assert his
construction, thereby forcing the courts to choose between two reasonable but competing interpretations? Yet at the very least, however, the
present interpretative regulation, if a reasonable, or even a possible,
construction, will be given "great weight" and if it survives one or two
statutory reenactments it will obtain the force of law under the Reynolds
case. As such ratification may require only two, three, or four years
under the present pace of revenue acts, it will occur before the taxpayer
has had a chance to question the regulation in the courts, for it is not
until about five or six years after the enactment of a Revenue Act that
controveries arising under it reach the courts. By that time the taxpayer will be attacking a regulation which, if not frozen solidly into the
law, will at least not be upset unless "plainly erroneous". 85 And finally
do not the Reynolds and Wilshire cases indicate that interpretative regulations possess equally with the traditional legislative regulations the
vital current of legislative force as respects their prospective operation,
in that the Commissioner is deemed authorized to change for the future
the existing meaning of a Revenue Act if the new construction be reasonable? 86 Must we not recognize the futility of resting on traditional
concepts of statutory construction and administrative power in the face
of the present course of decision of the Court? We may speculate
whether that course has been adopted for reasons of administrative
policy deemed sound by the Court, or because of a lazy unwillingness
on its part to analyze the statutory scheme respecting regulations and
its implications, or an understandable desire to avoid almost insoluble
problems of statutory construction by following the inviting path of
administrative construction. But we cannot wish away the results of
the recent decisions.
Nor has the Congress done anything to simplify the problem, but
instead has strewn the Revenue Acts with a miscellany of references
to administrative action without in any way indicating if the different
85. Compare the statements of the rule regarding the effect of administrative construction collected in Walker v. United States, 83 F. (2d) Xo3 (C. C. A. 8th, r936).
86. See Higgins v. Smith, 8 U. S. L. Wazx 92, 94 (U. S. 1940), in which the following appears: "If the Bureau's stand in the Jones case (decided by the Board of Tax
Appeals in 1930) represented a change in administrative practice, there can be no doubt
that the change operated validly at least from 1930 on", and for which the Wilshire case
is cited as authority.
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modes of expression are intended to imply differences in the degree
of power conferred upon the Commissioner. Section 23 (k) (i) allows
a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts "in the discretion of
the Commissioner", and a deduction for partial worthlessness when
the Commissioner is "satisfied" that the debt is recoverable only in part.
Section 41 requires, in the event no method of accounting is regularly
employed, a computation in accordance with such method as "in the
opinion of the Commissioner" clearly reflects the income. Section 44
provides for the installment method of reporting income "under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner". In Section 45 the Commissioner "is authorized" to allocate income and deductions among businesses owned by the same interests, if "he determines" that such
allocation is necessary. Under Section 46 a change of accounting period
requires "the approval of the Commissioner". A foreign corporation
is not cofisidered a corporation in certain cases under Section 112 unless it has been established "to the satisfaction of the Commissioner"
that an exchange in which it participated was not for the purpose of
avoiding tax. Affiliated corporations seeking to file consolidated returns under Section 141, and taxpayers seeking to exclude income
derived from the cancellation of indebtedness under Section 22 (b) (9),
must "consent" to regulations prescribed by the Commissioner. Under
Section 22 (d) (3) the use of the last-in first-out inventory method
must be "in accordance with such regulations" as the Commissioner
may prescribe. If the Commissioner "finds" that collection of the tax
is jeopardized, he shall demand immediate payment under Section
146 (a) (i), and the finding is presumptive evidence of the taxpayer's
design, but a similar finding under Section 146 (a) (2) apparently has
no such presumption attached to it. Under Section 273 if the Commissioner "believes" that assessment of a deficiency is jeopardized, he
shall immediately assess it. This is only a partial list, but it serves to
demonstrate the variety of the language used by the Congress.
There is thus a real need for acute analysis and study to be undertaken in an effort to ascertain whether these problems may be solved
by statutory action. Through such a study we may find answers to
these pertinent questions: Can the various degrees of Congressional
authorization of power to the Commissioner be standardized so that
the Congress, the Commissioner, the taxpayer, and the courts may
readily grasp the statutory scheme? In view of the complexity of the
Revenue Acts should the Commissioner be granted specific authority to
issue interpretative regulations? If so, what should be their scope and
effect? How far should we go in safeguarding the reliance of taxpayers upon the regulations issued by the Commissioner? In what way
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shall we meet the necessity of permitting changes in the regulations,
occasioned by new conditions, a more experienced judgment, or court
decisions? What effect shall we give to "tacit Congressional approval"
in its various forms, verbatim reenactment, substantially similar reenactment, or failure to amend, and under varying conditions, such as
frequent complete Revenue Acts or legislation merely amendatory of a
code? Can the confusion surrounding section 3791 (b) be removed, so
that the scope of the administrative power under that Section may be
clearly determined? Can the scheme of the regulations be so balanced
that taxpayers will not fear that the Commissioner can through his regulations stack the cards in his favor, and yet permit the Commissioner to
administer an admittedly complex but skeletonized law? No one would
for a moment contend that these questions, involving as they do interrelationships between the Commissioner, the taxpayer, the Congress,
and the courts, are susceptible of easy solution. Yet it would seem
the part of sound tax policy to attempt to deal with them in a manner
which permits of a comprehensive treatment rather than to leave their
determination to the slow, incomplete process of judicial decision.
POSTSCRIPT

The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Hallock 87 demonstrates most clearly two things-the mortality of tax
articles and the impossibility of placing the Court in a corner. As a
consequence of that decision, a Caesarian postcript is perhaps needed
to prevent this article from being stillborn.
In 1931 the Supreme Court in Klein v. United States,"" ruled that
an inter vivos transfer by A to B for life, remainder in A, but if A dies
before B, then to B in fee, was a transfer intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death within the meaning of Section
402 (c), later 302 (c), of the estate tax. In 1935 the Court in Helvering
v. St. Louis Trust Co. 89 and Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co.90 held
that an inter vivos transfer by A to B for life, remainder to B, but
if A survives B, then remainder to A, was not such a transfer as here
A only possessed a mere "possibility of a reverter". 91 The Regulations
under the estate tax were amended in 1937 to accord with the distinction adopted in the latter casesY2 The lower courts likewise accepted
the distinction as controlling.9 3 The Revenue Acts of 1936, 1938, and
87. Helvering v. Hallock, 8 U. S. L. WzEsc x92 (U. S.194o)
and McReynolds dissenting). Id. at I96.
88. 283 U. S. 231 (93i).
89. 296 U. S. 39 (1935).
9o. 296 U. S. 48 (1935).
9i. Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39, 43 (1935).
92. U. S. Treas. Reg. 8o, Art. 17, as amended.

(Justices Roberts

93. Cases cited by Justice Roberts in his dissent in Helvering v. Hallock, 8 U. S.

L. WEEic i96 (U. S. i94o).
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1939 contained amendments to the estate tax, and even to Section
3 02(d) in the case of the Act of 1936, but Section 302(C) was not repeated in terms in these Acts. Section 302(c) was of course reenacted
verbatim in 1939 as part of the Internal Revenue Code.94 Helvering v.
Hallock involved an inter vivos transfer which was thought by the
Circuit Court of Appeals 95 to fall into the St. Louis Trust basket rather
than the Klein basket. In the Supreme Court the Government contended that the St. Louis Trust cases were unsound and should be overruled, albeit the regulation based upon those cases was still on the books.
The Supreme Court agreed with the contention, stating that "the diversities taken in the St. Louis Trust cases" were untenable and should
be rejected in favor of a broad application of the Klein doctrine.
So far so good. As an original proposition only a crabbed conveyancer would defend the distinction taken in the St. Louis Trust
cases. But the taxpayer in the Hallock case forcefully urged that the
Court was faced not with an original proposition but with a rule of law
of at least five years standing. What of the doctrine of stare decisis?
But as stare decisis is "a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable", 96 the Court said it did not bar an overruling of the St. Louis
Trust cases. The taxpayer then asserted that Congress in the intervening years had not repudiated the St. Louis Trust cases and must
therefore be taken as having approved their doctrine. The Court's
answer was phrased by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
"It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping
Congressional silence to debar this Court from reexamining its
own doctrines. To explain the cause of non-action by Congress
when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative
g!-I. R. C. § 8II (c).
95. Helvering v. Hallock, IO2 F. (2d) i (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
96. Helvering v. Hallock, 8 U. S. L. WEEK 192, 195 (U. S. 1940). Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in his rejection of the contention based upon taxpayer reliance stresses the
fact that the transfers in question were all made and the settlors had died prior to the
St. Louis Trust cases. But this answer can hardly be considered a complete one, for
other taxpayers, relying upon the St. Louis Trust cases, and dying prior to the instant
case, may have determined that it was unnecessary in order to avoid taxation to divest
themselves of their interests in the transfers through a modification of their terms.
It is arguable, however, that the Supreme Court should not, or at least only rarely,

be moved by the existence of taxpayer reliance upon a prior decision. Congress, recognizing that hardships may be occasioned by a court decision upsetting prior doctrine or

practice, has in Section 379, (b) given ample power to the Treasury Department to
mitigate such hardships through a non-retroactive application of the decision. It may
therefore be proper for the Court to interpret the law unhampered by a consideration
of the hardship that may result, and to leave the problem of dealing with the question

of the possible alleviation of such hardship to the Treasury, where Congress has indicated that it properly belongs. But such a course of conduct would require an alert
and intelligent use of Section 3791 (b) by the Treasury. Consideration of taxpayer
reliance by the Court may be proper, however, where the Treasury by a failure to make
an amendment to the .regulations non-retroactive has indicated that it will not exercise
its power under Section 379, (b). See supra p. 574.
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unrealities. Congress may not have had its attention directed to
an undesirable decision; and there is no indication that as to the
St. Lonis Trust cases it had, even by any bill that found its way
into a committee pigeonhole. Congress may not have had its attention so directed for any number of reasons that may have moved
the Treasury to stay its hand. But certainly such inaction by the
Treasury can hardly operate as a controlling administrative practice, through asquiescence, tantamount to an estoppel barring
reexamination by this Court of distinctions which it had drawn.
Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy might
be suggested as reasons for the inaction of the Treasury and of
Congress, but they would only be sufficient to indicate that we walk
on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective
legislation a controlling legal principle." 97
While the taxpayer could now see that the contest was lost, he
chose to play the game of statutory construction to the bitter end. He
therefore called attention to the intervening Revenue Acts and contended that successive reenactment of a statute without change must be
considered as an adoption of the judicial construction given to the statute. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, now relegating the debate to the footnotes, answered in these words:
"Whatever may be the scope of the doctrine that re-enactment
of a statute impliedly enacts a settled judicial construction placed
upon the re-enacted statute, that doctrine has no relevance to the
present problem. Since the decisions in the St. Louis Trust cases,
Congress has not re-enacted § 302 (c). The amendments that Congress made to other provisions of § 302 in connection with other
situations than those now before the Court, were made without
re-enacting § 3o2(c). Nor has Congress, under any rational
canons of legislative significance, by its compilation of internal
revenue laws to form the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat.
i, impliedly enacted into law a particular decision which, in the
light of later experience, is seen to create confusion and conflict
in the application of a settled principle of internal Revenue legislation." 98
There was but one argument remaining-the existence of the Treasury
regulation adopting the doctrine of the St. Louis Trust cases. This also
was answered in a footnote:
"Since the Treasury has amended its regulations in an effort
to conform administrative practice to. the compulsions of the St.
Louis Trust cases, it cannot be deemed to have bound itself by
this change." 99
97. Ibid.
S8. Ibid.
9S. Ibid.
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What becomes of the doctrines of statutory construction which
we have been considering? Is there only the sound of quicksand closing
over the many cases decided on the ground that Congress must be
assumed to have been familiar with an existing administrative interpretation and that consequently its reenactment of statutory language
indicates approval or ratification of that interpretation? 100 For clearly
the words first quoted above with respect to Congressional silence apply
with equal force to an administrative interpretation and give the lie to
the whole reenactment doctrine. Our quarrel, as the preceding discussion has made clear,1 °1 is not with the substance of these words but with
the unruffled volte-fade that is apparent when they are placed against
the language controlling in prior decisions. Moreover, taxpayers had
been repeatedly told that an administrative interpretation may become
embedded in the statute through reenactment of the interpreted language, even though such interpretation when issued was not final in that
it could be reviewed by the courts. Were they not to believe that a
fortiori such reenactment would freeze an interpretation which had
been placed upon the statute by the Supreme Court itself and hence
was beyond review?
Perhaps the above is too strong in the light of the Court's assertion that here there is no occasion to apply the reenactment doctrine
because Section 302(c) was never itself reenacted. In other words,
that doctrine may be limited to instances of verbatim, or substantially
so, reenactment of the statutory language interpreted by the judiciary
or the administrative. 10 2 If this be true, the canons of statutory construction here turn on the mere mechanics of legislative draftsmanship.
The Revenue Acts of 1935 and 1937 are brief and hence convenience

does not require repetition of the standard sections. The Revenue
Acts of 1936 and 1938 are lengthy and contain numerous amendments,
so that it is desirable to make each complete in itself as regards the income tax. The estate tax and the gift tax are less frequently amended,
and consequently the taxpayer will not be confused if the Revenue Act
of 1938, for example, does not reenact those taxes completely when it
amends several of their sections. The Revenue Act of 1939 makes
relatively few amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, and hence
there is no occasion to depart from the general concept underlying that
Code as respects future Acts. Yet later Acts may contain so many
income tax amendments that the utility of the Code will be lost unless
the income tax chapter is restated in full. These are but questions of
legislative technique to be answered on the practical ground of convenxoo. Cases cited in note 47 mipra.
ioI. See suprap. 563.
102. But cf. cases cited in note 33 mipra.
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ience, both in the drafting of statutes and in the use to be made of them
by the public. But for the Court they apparently present matters vital
to the interpretation of the statutory language.
Nor, apparently, does the reenactment doctrine apply to an administrative regulation which is the result of a change made in order to
conform administrative practice to a decision of the Court. Perhaps
so, for if the decision is to be swept away, so must its administrative
progeny. But where does this rule end? All regulations are written
"in an effort to conform administrative practice to the compulsions"
of judicial decisions. The connection is more direct in some instances
than in others. But is the taxpayer to ascertain at his peril whether
the regulation is on the side of the line that qualifies it as an interpretation which may be embedded in the statute through later reenactment
rather than on the side which stamps it as one not capable of such
adoption?
Perhaps, as respects the reenactment doctrine, we are witnessing
the end of another judicial march up the hill and down again. Yet Mr.
Justice Roberts, who dissented in the Hallock case,' 0 3 had this to say
for a unanimous Court when on the same day he rendered its decision
in Morgan v. Commissioner 104 with respect to the meaning of the
phrase "general power of appointment" in the estate tax:
"The Treasury regulations have provided that a power is
within the purview of the statute, if the donee may appoint to any
person.
"With these regulations outstanding Congress has several
times reenacted Section 302(f), and has thus adopted the administrative construction." 'O5

Is the answer then to be found in these words in the HaIlock case:
"The Court . . . has from the beginning rejected a doctrine

of disability at self-correction." 106
The Court is free at any time to repent and to clear the past of misdeeds.
The Commissioner must live with his sins, or at best can do no more
than turn over a new leaf.
io3. Justice Roberts based his vigorous dissent upon stare decisis and the reenactment doctrine, as applied both to court decisions and administrative regulations. Chief
Justice Hughes concurred in the result upon the ground that the case was controlled by
the decision in Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231 (193).
io4. 8 U. S. L. WEEK 205 (U. S. 1940).
io5. Id. at 2o6.
io6. Helvering v. Hallock, 8 U. S. L. WEEK 192, i95 (U. S. 1940).

